Wednesday, January 9, 2013

Friday, January 4, 2013


IS MANDINGO FIGHTING AN ECONOMICALLY RATIONAL ACT? 

Problem
 Edna Greene Medford, has been quoted in a number of articles (http://www.nextmovie.com/blog/is-mandingo-fighting-a-real-thing/) concerning the film Django Unchained for her conclusion that economic rationality would have prevented the practice of ‘mandingo fighting’ in pre-civil war America given that : “enslaved people are property, and people don't want to lose their property unless they're being reimbursed for it," 

This conclusion, however, relies on a presupposition that is counter to traditional models of economically rational actors (that they do no risk their property unless they are being reimbursed). Indeed, this is a characteristic of an economically irrational actor (who will only make investments if they are certain to result in a 100% return)

Rejecting her assumption, however, her conclusion might still be tested with the following question ; Is mandingo fighting a rational economic action.

Summary of Results

If third party ‘insurance wagers’(wagers made between the slave owner and a third party) are not allowed, then mandingo fighting is an economically rational act if :

(-y) + ((-y)(-x1)) + 80,000x – x2y ≥ 40,000

Where:  y is the amount wagered on the fight
x1  is percentage belief that one slave owner has that their slave will win the fight
x2  is percentage belief that the other slave owner has that their slave will win the fight
x1 does not equal (1-x2), and
percentage belief that the other slave owner has that their slave will win the fight
            40,000 is accepted as the average value of a slave in todays dollars (http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/2011/04/06/bales-average-price-of-slave-has-decreased/)

If third party ‘insurance wagers’ are permitted in mandingo fighting, then, given the appropriate wager, it is always an economically rational action, except in the case where a slave owner has a 0% belief in their slave’s ability to win the fight.
Assumptions

We will start with the presumption that slave-owners are economically rational actors. This is a useful assumption for our present inquiry for two reasons. First, although theories of predictive bounded irrationality can provide some useful projections of how individuals will act in a modern economy, they begin to lose their integrity when nearly every one of their fundamental assumptions requires tweaking to address pre-Civil war society. Second, if we reject the premise that slave owners were economically rational actors then, the point is conceded that they might engage in mandingo fighting simply for the irrational malice and the argument that mandingo fighting would have been prevented out of economic self-interest is indicted.
We will continue with a second presumption concerning economically rational actors. That un-invested money and the potential for monetary grain through investment are treated as equally weighty in the mind of an economically rational actor. Put another way, an economically rational actor is not impact by ownership bias, or status quo bias. For example, an economically rational actor will when presented with an investment opportunity with a 51% chance of 200% return on investment and a 49% chance of 0% return on investment will weight that investment as worth more than the investment money and take the investment opportunity as often as possible. This in contrast to a non-rational economic actor that is risk-averse and weight the risk of a 0% return on investment too heavily and not make this rational investment.
However, if an investment opportunity offered only a 50%  chance of a 200% return on investment, the economically rational investor would be neutral on the investment.   This is in contrast to a risk-loving and irrational economic actor that may way the risk of a 50% chance of a return on investment too heavily and make this irrational investment.
Consider the decision expressed mathematically:
$100 of un-invested money (ignoring depreciation) is worth $100. Therefore, a rational economic actor will take any investment opportunity that is worth more than $100.00
$100 of investment money in the first investment scenario is worth:   (.51 x $200) + (.49 x $0) = $102. This investment opportunity is work more than $100.00 and investment is rational.
$100 of invested money in the second investment scenario is  worth : (.50 x $200) + (.50 x $0) = $100. This investment opportunity is not worth more than $100 and is, therefore irrational.

Analysis

According to Kevil Bales, the average price of a slave of 1809 was $40,000 (in todays’ dollars).  In the above model. This can be considered ‘un-invested money.’ It is invested in the body of the slave and, thus, worth the value of their labor, however that labor should not be included in the calculation of the value of the salve in a mandigo fight because it can be re-purchased for (on average) $40,000.
Therefore a economically rational slave-owner when presented with a mandigo fight investment opportunity will should take the opportunity in certain circumstances (when the opportunity is worth more than the value of the invested money : $40,000).
Whether the investment is worth more than $40,000 depends upon a reasonable prediction of the outcome of the fight. Because, as noted in  a number of reviews, these fights are “battles to the death”, they present a fairly simply game theory model (because there are only two possible outcomes : dead slave (100% lost of investment), alive slave (no loss of investment).

The potential outcomes are illustrated below :


Slave Owner 1 – Dead Slave
Slave Owner 2 -  Live Slave
Slave Owner 2 – Live Slave
Outcome 1
Slave Owner 2 has at least 100% return on investment (the slave investment + any additional wager)

Outcome 2
Impossible in “battle to the death”
Slave Owner 1 – Dead Slave
Outcome 3
Impossible in a “battle to the death” ? (I suppose the slaves could both kill each-other)
Outcome 4
Slave Owner 1 has at least 100% return on investment (the slave + any additional wager)

If either slave-owner has wagered at least one dollar, and there is a 51% chance that their preferred outcome will result, then they should take the opportunity to invest. What if, however, they have wagered more than one dollar? Consider for example they have wagered $120,000 (the value of 3 slaves?).
That presents the following equation in the mind of the economically rational salve owner (where x is the percentage of their slave winning the mandingo fight) :  
When is x($120,000) + (1-x)(-40,000) > 40000.
The solution, as you probably guessed, is anytime the chance that x > 1/3, it is economically rational to engage in the fight.  Meaning that given the appropriate wager, mandingo fighting with even a slave that is very likely to lose is a rational investment (continuing the logic, if your slave is a 5 to 1 underdog you will need to make a $200,000 wager, if your slave is a 6 to 1 underdog you will need to make a 240,000 wager).
It is unclear from descriptions of mandigo fighting whether the betting must be only between the slave owners or whether side investments between slave owners and third parties are permitted (assuming a third party wager is permitted then every mandingo fight can become an economically rational choice).
However, if the wager must be between slave owners (with slaves in the fight), then the question becomes : when will a deal be formed between the two. Contract theory provides us a model for assessing whether two parties will come to a deal, and it essentially boils down to whether there is a incongruity of beliefs between the parties, whose margin of error is within the range that renders a potentially positive outcome for both parties.
Explaining this in the above terms, another economically rational slave-owner would not take the $120,000 bet because his percentages are reversed if he believes the outcome of the match is the same as his opponent. His calculation looks like this (where x is the agreed likelihood of winning the match)
(1-x)(-120,000) + x (40,000) > 0
This is precisely the opposite of the other slave-owner so no deal will be made here.
However, if there is a differential in the belief of the outcome then two economically rational actors may make the deal. Consider the difference in beliefs that is necessary for a $120,000 wager to be rational for other sides.
One side must assess that (1-x)(-120,000) + x (40,000) > 0
This reduces to x > 2/3
The other must assess that (x)(120,000) + (1-x)(-40,000) > 0
This reduces to x > 1/4
 Therefore, in order for this mandingo fight to happen between economically rational actors, the first slave owners must believe his or her slave is at least a 67% (rounding up) chance to win, and the other must believe they are at least a 25% chance to win. There is clearly a gulf of information here 67 + 25 = 93, there is a seven percent overlap in their predictions, on when such an overlap occurs, a deal may rationally be struck between two parties with divergent information.
This can be abstracted to take into account the all variables, when x1 is the percentage belief that the one slave-owner has in the outcome that their slave will kill the opposing slave, x2 is the percentage belief of the opposite result and y is the proposed wager :
(-y) + ((-y)(-x1)) + 80,000x – x2y ≥ 40,000
Conclusion

Given the appropriate circumstances, mandingo fighting is an economically rational act. 

Monday, December 31, 2012

-- Amber Roberts, 30, a resident of the unit for the criminally insane at Eastern State Hospital in Spokane, Wash., informed officials in November that "I (just now) murdered someone, but you're going to have to find him." As staff members searched the facility, Roberts offered to help by shouting "hot," "cold," "you're getting warmer," and so forth. Roberts yelled "Very Hot!" as they closed in on the room containing the body of a 56-year-old patient that Roberts then admitted strangling. (However, a few days later in court, she pleaded not guilty.) [Associated Press via KATU-TV (Portland, Ore.), 11-21-2012] -- Notwithstanding its nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles and spy satellites, France maintains Europe's last "squadron" of military carrier pigeons. Legislator Jean-Pierre Decool lauds the pigeons and campaigns for their upgrade, warning that in the event of war or other catastrophe, the birds would be a valuable messaging network. (Pigeons have been used at times in the current Syrian civil war.) Until very recently, according to a November Wall Street Journal dispatch, pigeons wearing harnesses had been used by a hospital in Normandy to ferry blood samples to a testing lab (a 25-minute flight). [Wall Street Journal, 11-10-2012] -- Tunisia's Ministry for Women and Family Affairs demanded in October that the government prosecute the publisher of the children's magazine Qaws Quzah ("Rainbow"), aimed at ages 5 to 15, for an article in the then-current issue on how to construct a gasoline bomb (aka the "Molotov cocktail" in America). The country has been rocked by the same kind of upheaval experienced in other Arab countries, except less so since its longtime president stepped down rather quickly in January 2011. [BBC News, 10-9-2012] College student Courtney Malloy, 22, was rescued in November after getting stuck at about 1 a.m. trying to cut between two buildings in Providence, R.I. The space between City Sports and FedEx Kinko's was 8 to 9 inches, said firefighters, who found Malloy horizontal and about 2 feet off the ground and "unable" to explain how she got there The head of the Perse School in Cambridge, England, recently instituted a "10-Second Rule" for minor disciplinary infractions: Students could avoid punishment if they quickly produced a clever explanation for their misbehavior. "Getting children to talk their way out of a tight corner in a very short period of time" said Ed Elliott, encourages creativity and could produce a generation of British entrepreneurs. Said a supporter, "Often the ones who get further are the artful dodgers," who "bend the truth." (Elliott warned, though, that "out-and-out falseness" would not be tolerated.) [BBC News, 11-19-2012] "Braco," a Croatian-born "healer" (although he rejects the term), seems to make legions of sick or troubled believers feel better merely by entering a room and gazing at them in silence for a few minutes before leaving. (A Washington Post reporter, seeking relief from his allergies, attended a 100-person session in Alexandria, Va., in October, but found no improvement.) "Whatever is flowing through him," said one transfixed fan, "is able to connect with a part of us." Said another enthusiast, "The thing that makes Braco unique is he really doesn't do anything." [Washington Post, 10-12-2012] Plastic surgeons in Turkey and France told CNN in November that mustache implants have suddenly surged in popularity as Middle Eastern men use their increased lip bushiness to convey power and prestige. Surgeons extract follicles from hairier parts of the body in procedures that cost the equivalent of around $7,000 and show full results in about six months. An anthropology professor told CNN that, by tradition in Arab countries, a man of honor would "swear on my mustache," use mustaches as collateral for loans, shave off a vanquished foe's mustache as a reward, and gravely insult enemies with "Curse be upon your mustache!" [CNN, 11-29-2012]
Two British men have been banned from a restaurant in Brighton for eating too much from the 'all-you-can-eat' menu. George Dalmon and Andy Miles pop into the Mongolian restaurant Gobi twice a month, reports the BBC, paying £12 each. After the pair ate five bowls of food – each – at their last visit, the owner called them "filthy pigs" and told them to get out. "As we were eating the last bowl, the owner came up and said never to come back again, we're disgusting, and we're eating him out of business, so we're nothing but filthy pigs," says Mr Dalmon. "So, I was quite shocked about this and I asked him if he was joking and he replied 'no, I'm definitely not, I've had it with you two, that's it'." The owner, Peter Westgate, admitted he'd called them "filthy pigs". "Like when the shark shuts its eyes before it feeds, they're like that," he told the BBC. "They just get to the buffet and whatever happens, they just pile it in Read more: http://www.3news.co.nz/All-you-can-eat-diners-banned-for-eating-too-much/tabid/417/articleID/271556/Default.aspx#ixzz2Gh1goAOk EAST BREMERTON — A woman carrying a gun tried to rob the Sheridan Mini Mart late Thursday, but the clerk, who was on the phone, couldn't be bothered, according to Bremerton police. The suspect came into the convenience store, on Sheridan Road at Pine Road, about 10 p.m. The clerk noticed she was clutching a gun, but at first thought it was a joke, police said. The suspect told the clerk to unload the till. The clerk said he was busy and kept talking on the phone. The robbery suspect then left, police said. Police, helped by a tracking dog, couldn't find the suspect. Read more: http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2012/dec/28/east-bremerton-clerk-says-hes-too-busy-for/#ixzz2Gh7F042G